Given the size of the Japanese economy and the need for many of
Japan's large companies to restructure, foreign investors seem
puzzled by the slow start of the private equity and leveraged
finance market in Japan.
Looking first at some of the basic fundamentals, we can see that
the conditions for the market are improving. In the past few years,
mergers and acquisitions in Japan have become common; not only
domestic transactions among Japanese companies, but also
cross-border transactions between Japanese and non-Japanese
companies. Foreign investment in Japan has increased substantially
over the last five years. To revitalize the stagnant economy, Prime
Minister Koizumi announced in 2003 the government's policy goal to
double foreign capital investment into Japan over the next five
years.
Merger and acquisition activity provides a catalyst for the
development of the leveraged finance market as lawyers and
investment bankers look at innovative ways to structure and finance
deals. It is also indicative of changes in attitude and customs.
The economic reality in Japan is such that many companies have had
to restructure; banks have had to let go of tied relationships and
sell off loans through the securitization and distressed debt
markets; employees can no longer look to a lifetime commitment from
even the biggest companies; and shareholders are looking for better
returns and more accountability from management. Economic forces
are causing a fundamental shift in the Japanese business culture to
become more competitive.
In the US and Europe, leveraged finance plays an integral part
in merger and acquisition transactions. In Japan, we are also
starting to see the emergence of this financial tool in the market.
In the past few years, there has been an increase in acquisitions
by private equity funds and also management buyouts (MBOs). In 1998
nine deals with a total value of ¥5,111 million increased in 2001
to 22 deals with a total value of ¥1,165 billion, and in 2002 to 39
deals with a total value of ¥1,072 billion.
In tandem with such an increase in buyout activity, debt
financing for acquisitions has gained in popularity. The percentage
of leveraged deals as against the total buyout transactions
involving buyout funds before 2001 was about 45%, but this ratio
increased to about 70% in 2002. Even though it is still smaller in
size compared to the leveraged finance market in the UK, the
provision of leveraged finance by the four largest Japanese banks
in fiscal 2002 was reported to reach ¥150 billion to ¥200 billion.
One Japanese commercial bank was reportedly planning to triple its
volume of leveraged finance up to ¥50 billion in fiscal 2002.
While the bulk of the financing may be made to small to
mid-sized deals, there have been a few notable large deals, most
often led by non-Japanese private equity players in the market. The
biggest leveraged buyout in Japan in the year 2003, and among the
largest ever in the market, was the purchase by Ripplewood, a US
private equity fund, of Vodafone's equity interest in Japan
Telecom, a fixed line operator, for about ¥261 billion. About 76%
of this funding was comprised of debt (¥200 billion).
Foreign investment in Japanese equities
The amount of foreign investment in Japanese companies'
equity in the six years from 1997 to 2002 were as follows:
| Year |
Number |
Value |
| 1997 |
1,244 |
¥601 billion |
| 1998 |
1,351 |
¥815 billion |
| 1999 |
1,612 |
¥2,137 billion |
| 2000 |
1,782 |
¥2,736 billion |
| 2001 |
1,438 |
¥1,898 billion |
| 2002 |
1,383 |
¥1,727 billion |
| Source: Ministry of Finance of
Japan, "Conditions on Outbound and Inbound Direct
Investments" |
| Current trends in the Japanese
buyout market |
 |
| Source: Mitsubishi Research
Institute and Chuo Aoyama Audit Corporation,
Transaction Services Dept |
Breakdown of buyout transactions
| Types |
2002 (number) |
2002 (%) |
| MBO by leveraged finance |
9 |
56.3 |
| MBO by non-leveraged finance |
2 |
12.5 |
| MBI by leveraged finance |
1 |
6.3 |
| MBI by non-leveraged finance |
1 |
6.3 |
| MEBO by leveraged finance |
1 |
6.3 |
| MEBO by non-leveraged finance |
1 |
6.3 |
| Others |
1 |
6.3 |
| Total |
16 |
100 |
| Source: Mitsubishi Research
Institute and Chuo Aoyama Audit Corporation,
Transaction Services Dept |
Management buyouts becoming more popular
To increase the productivity of businesses, many Japanese
companies have been trying to shed non-core businesses and shift
the focus to core businesses. In the context of corporate
reorganizations and other insolvency proceedings, viable business
operations are often split off and sold to financial investors or
strategic buyers. Within this sector, MBOs are the most popular
form of buyout. The view seems to be that MBOs ensure consistency
of management and are a less drastic measure, and are thus the
culturally preferred form of buyout in Japan. The difficulty of
identifying and putting in place competent management from outside
is also another reason why MBOs are popular.
Nevertheless, the concept of a MBO is still quite new to most
Japanese businesses. As is the example of a success. It was only in
December 2002 that the first success story of the MBO was reported
— Japan Pure Chemical Co's (Nippon Koujundo Kagaku Kabushiki
Kaisha) listing on the Jasdaq over-the-counter market, three
years after the original MBO. This success story was covered widely
by the press, drawing a lot of attention to such new possibilities
from those who had never thought of using a MBO.
The Japan Pure Chemical transaction involved a listed exit route
for the investors. In another deal in March 2003, on which Ashurst
advised, the equity investors and management obtained a successful
exit through the sale of the business to a strategic investor. This
was the sale by Virgin Entertainment Group, Antfactory KK and
management of their shares in Virgin Cinemas Japan to Toho
Corporation. This is one of the first and most successful MBO exits
to date in Japan through a strategic sale and hopefully will
encourage more.
Buyout structures
There are several examples of the buyout methods available in
Japan.
Share acquisition (private)
In this case the
acquisition vehicle will purchase the target company's shares with
the proceeds of a loan and equity investment from a private equity
fund and the management. The target will usually provide a
guarantee and collateral over its assets as there are no financial
assistance prohibitions in Japan as there are in the UK for a
target to give financial assistance to persons acquiring shares in
the target. After the acquisition, the acquisition vehicle will
merge with the target company, giving the private equity fund and
management direct equity ownership of the target company.
Asset purchase
Another method involves the
acquisition vehicle purchasing the assets, constituting the
target's business with the proceeds of the equity and debt
financing and employing (all or some of) the workers engaged in the
operation of the target business, subject to obtaining the
employees' consent. The acquisition vehicle will become the
operating company after the business is purchased. For certain
types of asset deals specific legal requirements must be followed.
(See "Court procedure for asset purchase: court-appointed
inspector's appraisal" below.)
Share acquisition (public)
In the case of an
acquisition of a publicly traded company, the acquisition vehicle
usually proceeds with the purchase of the target shares through a
tender offer in accordance with the tender offer regulations
pursuant to the Japanese securities and exchange law. As it is
unlikely that the tender offer will succeed in the purchase of 100%
of the shares of the target, the acquisition vehicle will need to
engage in another transaction or series of transactions to acquire
the remaining minority shareholdings, such as through a statutory
share transfer scheme (Kabushiki iten), and subsequent sale
to a vehicle of 100% of the shares in the target, the net effect
being that the minority shareholders are squeezed out for cash.
In some jurisdictions this may be by way of compulsory
acquisition once a threshold shareholding is reached. However, such
a procedure is not yet available under Japanese regulations. As
part of efforts to streamline and modernize Japanese company law, a
compulsory acquisition method is proposed for consideration and is
expected to be adopted in the next couple of years.
Court procedure for asset purchase: court-appointed
inspector's appraisal
In the case of an asset purchase,
there is a potential legal hurdle in the purchase procedure under
the Commercial Code of Japan, commonly known as the court-appointed
inspector's appraisal requirement, or jigosetsuritsu asset
review.
The Code provides that if a corporation within two years of its
incorporation plans to purchase assets for use in the operation of
its business and at a price of 5% or more of the amount of its
paid-in capital stock, then the corporation will be required to
have the court appoint an inspector. The inspector will review the
contemplated purchase price of the assets and, based on his report,
the purchasing company will be required to have the purchase
approved by the shareholders by at least a two-thirds affirmative
vote.
This procedure is unpopular because it is costly to have the
court-appointed inspector review the purchase price and, from the
planning standpoint, it creates uncertainty as to the completion
and the timing of the closing of the transaction. While there are
exemptions from this requirement, such as a certificate as to the
fairness issued by an attorney, certified public accountant or tax
attorney, or the purchase being in accordance with a restructuring
plan approved by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry under
the industry revitalization special measure law (sangyou
katsuryoku saisei tokubetsusochi hou), the parties normally
seek to use a dormant company that is more than two years old to
avoid such procedural requirements.
While some may prefer this option, it also causes delay and
expense while one searches for, investigates and purchases the
dormant company. It also poses a potential risk of undisclosed
liability in the dormant company being purchased.
This court-appointed inspector's appraisal requirement for
certain asset purchase deals is expected to be abolished in the
next couple of years, but this is yet to be confirmed.
Leverage ratio
The leverage ratio in Japanese leveraged finance is in the range
of 50% to 70% (excluding mezzainine finance) (see below). This data
is based on survey responses from banks, and the number of samples
was small. Mezzanine finance is still seldom used in Japan,
although there have been a few deals where subordinated loans or
high-yield bonds have been made or issued.
By contrast the typical debt-to-equity ratio in UK deals without
mezzanine is roughly 60:40 and in those with mezzanine finance it
is roughly 70:30.
Ratio of equity and debt in leveraged buyouts
|
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
| Equity |
31.5 |
50.0 |
40.8 |
| Term loan |
67.7 |
50.0 |
59.2 |
| Others |
0.8 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
| Samples |
5 |
2 |
4 |
| Total |
100 |
100 |
100 |
| Source: Mitsubishi Research
Institute and Chuo Aoyama Audit Corporation,
Transaction Services Dept |
Documentation
Japanese leveraged finance documentation was modelled after UK
and US documentation when it was first introduced to the Japanese
market. Except for the security issues, the basic document
structure is still similar to that of UK loan documentation.
Typical covenants included in the loan agreement are: (a)
restrictive covenants, including: (i) restriction on additional
indebtedness (including guarantees); (ii) restriction on dividends
and other distributions; (iii) restriction on sale of assets and
granting of security interests (negative pledge); and (iv)
restrictions on acquisitions, investments, mergers or
consolidations; (b) affirmative covenants, including: (i)
maintenance of corporate existence; (ii) compliance with laws;
(iii) maintenance of governmental licences if applicable; and (iv)
provision of periodic reports (monthly, quarterly, semi-annually,
and annually); and (c) financial covenants, including: (i) debt
service ratio; (ii) interest coverage ratio; (iii) leverage ratio;
and (iv) net worth.
Debt finance components
Term loan
A term loan is used to fund the
acquisition and sometimes to also repay the existing loans of the
target. The repayment of the term loan usually starts after a grace
period of one to one-and-a-half years, and it is typically repaid
over five to seven years, depending upon the applicable cash-flow
projections. Prepayment is usually mandatory if any excess cash
arises, and for this purpose the lenders will closely monitor the
cash management of the borrower. The interest rate and arranger fee
level, although subject to change and differing in each deal, have
been reported to be (in case of the former) in a range of TIBOR
plus about 3% and (in the case of the latter) about 2.5% of the
purchase price.
Credit facility
A credit facility will also often be
put in place to provide funding for working capital and other
business needs of the target after the transaction is complete. It
may be a remote issue for a leveraged finance transaction, but
lenders should not ignore the potential issue of Japanese usury law
and availability of the exemption from the application of a broad
definition of interest thereunder.
In Japan usury law provides that any money received by the
lender in connection with the loan, regardless of the name attached
to it (such as discount, fee, commission, gratitude), shall be
deemed "interest" for the purposes of usury law. This provision
could be problematic because the fees payable for the credit
facility may result in a technical violation of the maximum lawful
interest rate under the law if no or only small amount is drawn
down from the facility relative to such fees. An exemption is
available, among others, if the borrower is a corporation
(kabushiki kaisha) with capital stock of ¥300 million or
more. The lenders should therefore check the capital stock of the
acquisition vehicle, which should rarely be below such a
threshold.
Mezzanine finance
Mezzanine finance including
subordinated loans (or in limited cases, high-yield notes), ranking
between the senior, secured loan and equity, may be used. The
Japanese market however does not use structural subordination.
Rather contractual subordination provisions are used to give prior
status to senior loans.
Stock options (shinkabu yoyakuken) as
sweeteners
A typical equity sweetener attached to debt
financing, if applicable, is a stock option to purchase new shares
from the borrower. The stock options should provide for the
mechanism of succession and adjustment in the case of the borrower
merging with the operating company.
In respect of the payment upon exercise of options and also for
new shares in general, it should be noted that the Commercial Code
is stringent in ensuring that the issuing company actually receives
payment of the full price for the new shares, and in the case of
payment for new shares issuable upon exercise of the stock options,
the actual payment in cash of the full price of shares issuable
upon the options is required (except in the case of convertible
bonds).
Collateral issues
Traditionally, Japanese banks used to look mainly to real
property as the main means of security for bank loans. In a
leveraged finance deal, the banks look to cash flow of the business
operations and seek to secure the senior loans with all or
substantially all of the target assets (to the extent
practical).
In Japan, however, there is no comparable scheme to a floating
charge for a bank financing, and the security interest has to be
created and perfected with respect to each item of collateral. A
security called corporate collateral (or kigyou tampoken),
modelled after an English concept of a floating charge and
encompassing all assets of the debtor corporation, can be used only
for corporate bonds (shasai) issued by a corporation
(kabushiki kaisha), but not for other types of debt
obligations.
Real property
Security interests created over real
property are commonly mortgages (teitouken) although pledges
(fudousan shichi) may also be created over real property. In
either case, such security interests need to be registered with the
local legal affairs bureau for the perfection of the security
interest over the real property. The registration procedure itself
is straightforward, but because the registration fee is assessed at
0.4% of the principal amount of secured obligations (as opposed to
the value of the property), the lenders and borrower often discuss
whether it makes sense to have the whole of the debt obligations
secured by the real property if the borrower has many pieces of
real property of smaller value, or if there is significant
difference in the value of a certain piece of real property and the
principal of the loan to be secured.
Stock collateral
One of the most important classes
of collateral is the pledge of shares of the acquisition vehicle
(and upon the merger, the shares of the surviving entity). The
perfection of a share pledge is as simple as that for the sale of
shares — actual delivery of share certificates.
This form of share pledge is commonly called a simplified pledge
(ryakushichi). If the pledge is also registered in the
shareholder registry and is endorsed on the face of the share
certificates (touroku shichi), then the pledgee will be
entitled to assert its position as pledgee as against the issuer
and can receive directly from the issuer the dividends and (upon
liquidation) distribution of residual assets. In the case of a
simplified pledge, the pledgee will need to present the share
certificates to the company when exercising its rights against the
company as pledgee.
A potential legal issue could occur at the time of an auction
sale (private or public). It is likely that there is a share
transfer restriction in respect of those pledged shares, requiring
the company's board approval for the transfer of shares. It is
legally uncertain whether the board can give a blanket approval at
the time of creation of pledge (without knowing who will purchase
the shares in the future).
Even though there is a procedure under the Commercial Code for
the designation of a replacement transferee if the board declines
to approve the proposed transferee, it would cause a delay and
uncertainty in the sale of pledged shares. In some cases therefore,
the share transfer restriction in the articles of incorporation of
the company is taken out at the time the stock collateral is
created. In others, the article is amended to provide for the
exception from the restriction to the effect that share transfer
restriction is applicable except to the transfer to creditor/share
pledgee X, and the board approves in advance the transfer to
creditor/share pledgee X if creditor X enforces the share
pledge.
Collateral over inventory or other movables
The
typical form of security interest over movables under the Civil
Code of Japan is the pledge (shichiken). However, a pledge
over a movable asset can only be created and perfected upon actual
delivery of the movable asset to the pledgee.
This delivery requirement poses a difficulty in practice where
the pledgor needs to keep custody of the movable assets, in
particular in the case of inventory. The practical alternative to
the pledge is the security assignment (jouto tampo) in which
the title to the goods is transferred to the secured creditor as a
security for the loan and the title transfer is perfected by way of
either actual or constructive delivery of the goods. Under the
constructive delivery method, the borrower may continue to keep
custody of and use the goods, and in the case of the inventory,
until the secured obligations become due or otherwise accelerated,
the borrower is permitted to sell the goods and the new goods
delivered to the borrower in the warehouse will be subject to
this security interest.
While this is practical and convenient from the borrower's
perspective, it is a weak form of security interest in that a third
party may obtain the full title without any encumbrance if it is a
bona fide purchaser and takes delivery of the goods. Therefore,
historically, banks have not viewed inventory as an important
collateral source, and this weakness needs to be duly noted.
Collateral over receivables
Collateral over a
monetary claim takes the form of either a pledge
(saikenshichi) or a security assignment (saiken jouto
tanpo), but in the case of revolving trade receivables, a
security assignment is the customary form of security interest. A
practical issue concerning taking collateral over a receivable is
that many agreements provide for non-assignability of loan or other
receivables in Japan and to create valid collateral, the debtors'
consent to the pledge or security assignment is required. The
perfection of the pledge and security assignment is the same, and
can be made by one of the following means: (i) notice to the debtor
of the receivable with a certified date (kakutei hizuke);
(ii) consent by such a debtor with a certified date; or (iii)
filing with the legal affairs bureau.
Bank account pledge
The bank account security
arrangement is important for the lenders. The most secure and
common way is a pledge over the account to which the borrower
credits cash to be received from its business or trade customers.
Since the bank deposit agreement has a standard restriction for
transfer or pledge of the bank account, the deposit bank's consent
(that is, waiver) is first required to effectively create a pledge.
A pledge can be perfected by one of the following means: (i) notice
to the bank with which the account is opened with a certified date;
(ii) consent by such a bank with a certified date; or (iii) filing
with the legal affairs bureau.
Security trustee or security agent
What complicates
the perfection procedure is that in Japan a security trustee is not
commonly used because Japanese law does not permit creditors and
security interest holder(s) to be separate entities (with the
exception of bond trustees holding interests in corporate
collateral on behalf of bondholders of collaterized corporate
bonds).
As a consequence, each secured creditor will need to be a
party to the security documentation and perfect its own security
interests. The exercise by an individual lender alone of its
security interest will normally be contractually restricted by the
agreement among the creditors, but the restriction is not risk free
and is excused in the case of bankruptcy of the borrower.
Since the history of syndicate lending in the domestic Japanese
lending market is quite short (only in 2001 was a standard form of
syndicate loan agreement publicized by the Japan Syndication and
Loan-trading Associations) the efforts to date have not yet
produced a practical solution to ensure collective action by a
syndicate of secured creditors, and the market still relies on the
contractual restrictions as among the secured lenders.
Guarantee
Japanese law has no special rule to invalidate an upstream
guarantee given by a subsidiary in respect of a debt of its parent
or affiliated company. The concept of financial assistance does not
exist under Japanese law, and only the rules governing the validity
of guarantees in general need to be satisfied. The rules governing
guarantees in general are quite simple under Japanese law, and the
valid formation of a guarantee agreement and valid existence of the
indebtedness to be guaranteed are the main requirements. However,
the issues under Japanese law relating to fraudulent conveyance or
avoidance need to be noted.
Fraudulent conveyance or avoidance issue
If the borrower in a leveraged finance is highly leveraged, its
asset position may easily come close to negative. The potential of
avoidance of the transaction (or part of it) is worth serious
consideration in many cases.
Avoidance of guarantee as gratuitous act (mushou
hinin)
If a debtor engages in a gratuitous act
during a period of six months preceding cessation of making
payments as they fall due (shiharai teishi) or a petition
for bankruptcy (or start of other insolvency proceeding), such act
will be subject to avoidance by a bankruptcy trustee or other
competent administrator or trustee in the proceeding.
If a guarantee is given without any guarantee fee (which is the
case with almost all leveraged finance transactions), then there is
a potential risk of avoidance of gratuitous act if a guarantor
stops payment or a petition for insolvency proceeding is filed with
respect to a guarantor within six months from the time of the
giving of a guarantee. While a guarantee given with a guarantee fee
is not subject to such gratuitous act avoidance, it may be subject
to another category of intentional avoidance (koi hinin) if
it is prejudicial to creditors in general and both the guarantor
and creditor had requisite intent or knowledge.
Avoidance of granting of security interest
The
granting of a security interest made concurrently with the
borrowing is in general not viewed as prejudicial to creditors and
not subject to avoidance. In regard to collateral provided by a
subsidiary or an affiliate of the borrower (acquisition vehicle),
the same discussion made with respect to guarantees will apply and
such act will run a risk of gratuitous act avoidance unless such
affiliate receives a fee for it.
Avoidance of perfection (taikouyouken no
hinin)
Perfection of a security interest must be
made no later than 15 days from the date of its creation. If the
perfection is made later than the 15-day period from the creation
of security interest and if a petition for insolvency proceedings
or payment stoppage is filed or occurs before the perfection, such
perfection itself will be subject to avoidance by the bankruptcy
trustee (or other competent administrator or trustee in the
proceedings).
Cautious optimism
Apart from the legal framework, leveraged finance deals are of
course influenced by a number of factors, including the
availability of private equity, the strength and prospects of the
stock markets and the general economic outlook.
There also needs to be an availability of high-quality deals to
give confidence to the market. Now the big four Japanese banks are
entering the market with their superior network of company and
industry contacts, combined with greater foreign investor interest,
greater expertise in the services sector from lawyers and
accountants that have gained experience internationally as well as
locally, as well as the pick up in the economic outlook and stock
markets, there is room for cautious optimism that the market in
Japan is ripe for growth.
Author
biographies
John
McClenahan
Ashurst Tokyo
John McClenahan is managing partner of Ashurst Tokyo and head of
Ashurst's Asia practice, having worked for Ashurst in Tokyo for
more than eight years after relocating from the firm's
international finance department in London. He specializes in
banking and finance, private equity and structured finance
transactions.
He has extensive experience in the banking and finance sector
and has also worked on a number of private equity/leveraged finance
transactions both in London and in Japan. He recently advised
Virgin on the sale by Virgin Entertainment Group and other
shareholders of their stake in Virgin Cinemas Japan, one of the
most successful cases of an exit from a management buyout
transaction in Japan to date. McClenahan also advises extensively
on the establishment and setting up of private equity investment
funds, both regional and country specific, in the Asia region
targeted to invest in a variety of sectors.
As well as being qualified as a solicitor in England and Wales,
he is also admitted as a solicitor to the Supreme Court of New
South Wales and as a Gaikokuho Jimu Bengoshi in Japan. He is a
member of the First Tokyo Bar Association of
Japan.
Ken Kiyohara
Ashurst Tokyo
Ken Kiyohara is a partner of Ashurst Tokyo Law Office, which is
the registered joint enterprise office with Ashurst in Tokyo. He
has many years of experience in representing and advising both
Japanese and international clients on a range of corporate and
finance transactions, with particular emphasis on structured
finance, leveraged finance, private equity and M&A deals.
He has worked and studied in the United States as well as Japan
and has particular experience in large and complex cross-border
transactions.
Kiyohara is admitted in Japan as bengoshi (since 1992) and also
in New York (since 1998). He is a member of the Dai-ichi Tokyo Bar
Association as well as other international professional
organizations, including the American Bar Association,
International Bar Association and Inter-Pacific Bar
Association.
Ashurst, Tokyo
Kioicho Building, 8th
Floor
3-12 Kioicho
Tokyo 102-0094
Japan
T: + 81 3 5276 5900
F: + 81 3 5276 5922
Web: www.ashurst.com